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ABSTRACT 
 
The Maquiladora industry was created in the mid-1960 as the United States terminated the 
Bracero program. The main objective of the Bracero program was to bring in Mexican workers to 
fulfill U.S. agricultural labor demand. The end of the Bracero program left thousands of 
unemployed farm workers in Mexican cities bordering the U.S. The Maquiladora program’s intent 
was to subsidize foreign manufacturers that set up plants on the Mexico side of the border to 
create jobs for the Mexican workers. Mexico allowed plants to temporarily import supplies, parts, 
machinery, and equipment necessary to produce goods and services in Mexico duty-free as long 
as the output was exported back to the United States. U.S. firms, as well as other multinational 
companies, responded enthusiastically to the lure of cheap labor.  Mexico experienced high 
economic growth and become a major player in exporting intra-industry products to the U.S. The 
NAFTA and other free trade agreements signed by Mexico helped the economic growth of the 
Maquiladora region. Maquiladora employment increased significantly since the inception of the 
Maquiladora industry and Maquiladora exports now account for half of Mexico’s total exports. 
The Maquiladora industry is U.S.-demand driven since most of Mexico’s Maquiladora production 
is destined for the U.S. market. The recent recession in the U.S. took a heavy toll on Mexico’s 
Maquiladora industry. Another challenge to the Maquiladora industry is raising global 
competition, particularly from China. Therefore, the magnitude of the industry’s contraction 
during the most recent recession suggests that there are more factors influencing the industry than 
just the business cycle. This paper presents the creation of the Maquiladora industry, its success 
following the NAFTA agreement, and its recent downturn. It also explores the answers to the 
following questions: How much of the Maquiladora downturn was due to the business cycle? How 
much was due to structural change? Is the Maquiladora industry ready to face rising global 
competition? 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
exico‘s Maquiladora industry has been one of the economic success stories of the last 40 years. 
Started in the mid-1960 with a dozen facilities and a few thousand employees and reached its peak 
in 2000 with over 3700 plants and over 1.3 million workers.  With its facilities primarily located 
along the Mexican-American border, the Maquiladora industry benefits from a special system of preferences. This 
system allows for a temporary importation of raw materials from the U.S. into Mexico, where they are assembled 
and re-exported (no less than 80% of the output) to the U.S., paying a low import duty, approximately 7 percent, on 
the value added in Mexico only. Both U.S. and foreign US-based firms have benefited from this system. 
 
 The Maquiladora industry represents about 9 percent of Mexico‘s formal employment. It is Mexico‘s main 
source of foreign exchange—more than $18 billion last year—and provides 55 percent of the country‘s 
manufacturing exports. The importance of Maquiladora to the U.S. economy lies in the 26,000 companies located 
throughout the U.S. that supply Maquiladora with machinery, raw materials, and components (Garza 2003). The 
Maquiladora industry has, however, experienced its biggest unemployment and industry contraction between 2001 
and 2003.  The industry lost more than 290,000 jobs and approximately 873 plants (Castro 2003). This significant 
M 
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increase in unemployment and industry contraction suggests that there are more factors at work than just the effect 
of a business cycle. Many observers, including economists who are interested in the region, multinational 
companies, the Mexican government, and the media, are questioning the future of the Maquiladora industry. This 
paper presents the creation of the Maquiladora industry, its success following the NAFTA agreement, and its recent 
downturn. It also explores the answers to the following questions: How much of the Maquiladora downturn was due 
to the business cycle? How much was due to structural change? Is the Maquiladora industry ready to face rising 
global competition? The paper tracks the following outline: 
 
 Creation of the Maquiladora Industry 
 Success of the Maquiladora Industry 
 The Maquiladora Industry Downturn 
 The Maquiladora Industry and Global Competition 
 Current Challenges to the Maquiladora Industry 
 Future of the Maquiladora Industry 
 Conclusion 
 
CREATION OF THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY 
 
 The Mexican government initiated the Border Industrialization Program in 1965 as a response to the 
termination of the "Bracero Program" by the U.S. government in 1964. The Bracero Program had allowed Mexican 
agricultural workers (mostly migrating northbound from the interior of Mexico) to work legally in the U.S. on a 
seasonal basis. After the end of the Bracero Program, the Mexican government was forced to implement the 
Maquiladora Program to alleviate the rising unemployment burden along the border. The Maquiladora program‘s 
intent was to subsidize foreign manufacturers that set up plants on the Mexico side of the border to create jobs for 
the Mexican workers. Mexico allowed plants to temporarily import supplies; parts, machinery, and equipment 
necessary to produce goods and services in Mexico duty-free as long as the output was exported back to the U.S. 
Highlights of the Maquiladora program are summarized in Exhibit 1. The Mexican government also sought to utilize 
this program to increase the level of "hard currency" and as a vehicle for the transfer of technology.  
 
In the early 1980's, many U.S. businesses were feeling the "squeeze" from their Asian competitors and had 
decided that in order to remain in business, lower labor costs were necessary. As they began to look to Asia as an 
option for their investments, Mexico's currency devaluation, economic crisis, and proximity to the U.S., shown in 
Exhibit 2, became both an opportunity for U.S. companies to benefit from investment in Mexico, who badly needed 
hard currency, and an enthusiastic response to the lure of cheap labor.   
 
 
Exhibit 1 
Highlights Of The Maquiladora Program 
 
I. Maquiladora firms can import materials and capital equipment free of duty and value added tax, on a 
temporary basis for use in the manufacture of exported goods or to support those activities related to 
export. 
II. Maquiladora firms can be 100% foreign owned and have the right to employ foreign managers, 
technicians, and trainers. 
III. After 2001, Maquiladora firms can sell up to 100% of their products in the domestic market, upon 
payment of duties on any in-bond inputs. 
IV. Maquiladora firms can choose to locate anywhere in Mexico. 
V. Maquiladora firms have full access to the United States market under the NAFTA Agreement while still 
taking advantage of in-bond incentives on sales to other countries. 
VI. Many Maquiladora firms can benefit from new sectoral promotion program featuring import duties on 
machinery and inputs ranging from 0 - 5% after 2001. 
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Mexico experienced high economic growth and became a major player in exporting intra-industry products 
to the U.S. The NAFTA and other free trade agreements signed by Mexico helped the economic growth of the 
Maquiladora region. Maquiladora employment increased significantly since the inception of the Maquiladora 
industry and Maquiladora exports accounted for half of Mexico‘s total exports.  
 
 
 
Exhibit 2 
Map of U.S. – Mexico Border States and Cities 
 
SUCCESS OF THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY 
 
 Mexico‘s system of export promotion incentives, which include duty-free imports of inputs and machinery 
as well as the ability to employ foreign managers and technicians, combined with supporting economic policies 
created a vibrant and diversified Maquiladora industry. The number of plants increased to its highest level of 3700 in 
2000, with total employment of more than 1.3 million as shown in Exhibit 3. The success of the Maquiladora 
industry in the 1980‘s and 1990‘s has led to its rapid double-digit growth in both employment and new 
establishments, with investment primarily from American, Asian, Mexican, and some European sources.  
 
 
Exhibit 3 
Maquiladora Employment (in thousands) and Number of Plants 
1998 - 2006 
Year 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
Employment 1,063 1,195 1,347 1,122 1,089 1,072 1,139 1,173 1,201 
No. of Plants 3,092 3,384 3,655 3,494 2,975 2,780 2,811 2,918 3,000 
Source: www.maquiladoradirectory.com/statistics/index.htm  
 
 
Investors from around the world have taken advantage of the benefits of Mexico‘s Maquiladora program. 
In 1998 alone, nearly 400 new operations were approved under this plan. Since it was formalized, this system of 
export incentives has evolved far beyond its original focus on in-bond temporary imports of machinery and inputs. 
The government‘s strategies have enhanced the value of incentives to investors while at the same time honoring the 
country‘s international commitments to the NAFTA agreement as well as to agreements with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  
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 The Maquiladora industry has been one of the most important export sector in Mexico largely because of 
its ability to produce high technology products and other consumer goods for world markets. These technological 
strengths, combined with a young and highly competitive labor force, a strategic location, and other advantages, 
have helped the industry to lead the country‘s export growth and establish Mexico as the 8th largest exporter in the 
world. The industry was also maturing somewhat, becoming less of an industry that was based on saving labor costs 
to an industry that was positioning itself as a platform for global production and export.  
 
 The Mexican economy has been one of the most open in the world, with significant access under 
preferential conditions to markets in North America and most of Latin America. Mexico is an active participant in 
the main multilateral form and has also negotiated free trade agreements with Latin American countries, Israel, 
Japan, and the European Union. Investors from around the world are taking advantage of the country‘s unique 
position and stronger protection for investments and intellectual property rights, making Mexico one of the leading 
destinations for foreign direct investment among all developing nations. 
 
THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY DOWNTURN 
 
 The Maquiladora industry grew rapidly during the 1990‘s. It, however, experienced a sharp decline after 
October 2000 as shown in Exhibit 3and 4. Between October 2000 and March 2002, the industry lost 278,000 jobs, a 
21 percent decline. During the Maquiladora recessionary period, many observers questioned the Maquiladora 
industry‘s future. Some spectators identified the ongoing U.S. recession and the American industrial sector‘s poor 
performance as the main causes of the industry‘s plunge. Others pointed to structural factors, such as higher 
Mexican wages, high business taxes, and increasing foreign competition. This quarrel rises the questions of how 
much of the Maquiladora downturn was due to the business cycle, how much was due to structural change, and 
whether the Maquiladora industry is ready to face rising global competition. 
 
 
Exhibit 4 
Growth and Downturn of Manufacturing Production in Maquiladora 
1993 – 2003  
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Although the cyclical downturn in the U.S. economy has been a principle factor in the decrease in 
Maquiladora production and employment since 2000, the Maquiladora industry has also faced increased global 
competition, particularly from China, Central America, and the Caribbean. The real appreciation of the peso relative 
to the dollar and to key competitors‘ currency has heightened such pressure. Additionally, Mexican government 
policies, such as changes in the tax regime applied to the Maquiladora industry, have created a climate of 
uncertainty for investors. Meanwhile, commitment to the NAFTA agreement in Mexico has now phased out some 
benefits to the Maquiladora industry.  
 
 Acevedo (2003), Director of Macroeconomic Analysis in Mexico‘s Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, 
also discussed the primary causes of the Maquiladora recession, listing weak external demand, the higher cost of 
labor and services in Mexico, commercial and fiscal regulations, and international competition. Acevedo‘s economic 
model estimates that 80 percent of the decline in Maquiladora exports was due to a decline in U.S. demand for 
Maquiladora products. He blamed a combination of increasing costs (in the form of higher wages and more 
expensive services) and rising international competition. Certainly Chinese exports to the U.S. have rebounded to 
rates they enjoyed before the recession, while Mexican exports are still lagging. China‘s market share has continued 
to increase, with China now the first most important supplier to the U.S. economy. Meanwhile, Mexican exports to 
the U.S. have remained almost constant, at approximately 11 percent of the U.S. total imports. 
 
The Maquiladora Downturn Due To Business Cycles 
 
 The fact that Maquiladora production is often linked to U.S. manufacturing through production sharing 
arrangements and that approximately 95 percent of the Maquiladora production is destined for the U.S. market, it is 
not surprising that the Maquiladora industry is sensitive to fluctuations in U.S. manufacturing and demand. This 
connection also indicates that Maquiladora employment typically increases when the overall U.S. economy expands 
and is decreases when the U.S. economy slows down. In addition, although the Mexican economy as a whole is very 
closely linked to that of the U.S., the Maquiladora industry appears to have been affected by the U.S. economic 
slowdown more severely than the overall Mexican economy.  
 
 Gruben (2003), Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and Director General of its Center for 
Latin American Economics, discussed the impact of the 2001 U.S. business cycle slowdown on the Maquiladora 
industry. He presented the results of an econometric model that attributes more than 80 percent of the Maquiladora 
employment declines in 2001 and 2002 to changes in U.S. aggregate demand and increases in the cost of doing 
business in Mexico. He also concluded that structural factors, such as China‘s 2001 entrance into the World Trade 
Organization and North American Free Trade Agreement Article 303, caused significant negative impacts on 
Maquiladora employment, especially in the textile, apparel, and electronics sectors.  
 
 Gerber (2003), Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at San Diego State University, also 
indicated that some of this downturn is primarily cyclical and relates to the slowdown in world economic output and 
the recession in U.S. manufacturing. On a positive note, Gerber said that although global FDI has been down, 
Mexico‘s share has basically been unchanged. In other words, global investors are not seeing Mexico or the 
Maquiladora differently than before the downturn.  
  
The Maquiladora Downturn Due To Structural Change 
 
 In addition to the duty-free treatment on import of parts, components, and other inputs, Maquiladora plants 
enjoyed, at least until the mid-1990‘s, a virtual freedom from taxation. Although they were legally subject to income 
taxes, in practice, the companies paid only a small assets tax, a flat minimum of 2 percent of the value of the 
Maquiladora‘s assets. Moreover, the Maquiladora industry was permitted to use the cost of wages to offset their tax 
on assets. This practice virtually eliminated taxes for some Maquiladora companies.  
 
 The tax regime applicable to Maquiladora remained constant for almost 30 years but began to evolve 
rapidly in the 1990‘s. The most significant of these tax changes was the treatment of what are known as ―permanent 
establishments.‖ A permanent establishment typically is a branch of a company from one country that is doing 
business in another ―host‖ country and which may be taxed in that host country; as such, permanent establishment is 
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a concept found in virtually all double taxation treaties. Mexico essentially exempted Maquiladora from the tax that 
could be imposed on permanent establishments until 1998. However, starting in 1998, Mexico began seeking to treat 
the foreign parent companies of Maquiladora as having permanent establishments in Mexico for tax purposes. By 
treating the Maquiladora as permanent establishments, the Mexican government could subject the foreign parent 
companies to taxation, potentially allowing Mexico to increase the revenues it collects from Maquiladora operations. 
 
Such changes in Mexican government tax policies created uncertainty that caused some firms to withdraw 
from Mexico, to downsize their operations, or to be discouraged from new foreign direct investment in Mexico. In 
particular, the frequent changes to the fiscal regime have increased the tax burden and administrative costs to the 
Maquiladora industry and have reduced its ability to develop long-term investment plans.  
 
 Canas, et al. (2007) used the Maquiladora data to cover broad industry categories and investigated the 
cyclical vs. structural aspects of the economic downturn and recovery between 2000 and 2004. They concluded that 
structural losses took place in furniture, toys, leather, and textile industries and cyclical losses occurred in the large 
electronics sector and the transportation industry, which includes automobiles. 
 
The Maquiladora Downturn Due To Global Competition 
 
 Since China formally joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, it has become a more attractive choice 
for foreign direct investment, while foreign investment in Mexico‘s Maquiladora industry has decreased. Among the 
major suppliers of imports to the U.S., Mexico ranked second and China ranked third in 2002. Although both 
countries experienced significant growth in exports to the U.S. since 1995, the U.S. imports from Mexico grew at a 
slower pace than those from China.  As a result, the gap between Mexico and China narrowed in China‘s favor as 
shown in Exhibit 5. Statistics show that during the economic downturn (2000-2002), China gained U.S. market 
share in 35 of the 47 import categories, including toys, furniture, electrical household appliances, television and 
video equipment and parts, and apparel and textiles.  
 
 
Exhibit 5 
U.S. Imports from Mexico and China in Billions of U.S. Dollars 
1998 -2007 
Year 1988 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Mexico $94.63 $109.72 $135.93 $131.34 $134.62 $138.06 $155.90 $170.11 $198.25 $210.71 
China $71.17 $81.79 $100.02 $102.28 $125.19 $152.44 $196.68 $243.47 $287.77 $321.44 
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division  
 
 
Maquiladora Downturn Due To NAFTA’s Implementation Of Article 303 
 
 The phasing out of Maquiladora benefits as part of the NAFTA agreement also contributed to the decrease 
in Maquiladora production and employment. When NAFTA was signed in 1993, it envisioned fundamental changes 
to the Maquiladora model. The most significant of these changes was embodied in Article 303 of NAFTA, which 
eliminated duty drawback (or refunds of duties) for inputs from non-NAFTA origin as of January 1, 2001, if the 
final products incorporating these inputs were to be subsequently exported to another NAFTA country. The rationale 
behind Article 303 was to encourage firms to develop North American suppliers for critical inputs by providing an 
incentive for Maquiladora to shift sourcing of components or inputs to North America, including Mexico. The 
elimination of duty drawback would necessitate significant changes in the sourcing of Maquiladora inputs, 
particularly for Maquiladora operations of some Japanese and other Asian companies that were heavily dependent 
upon certain inputs from the Far East. Even though a 7-year grace period was provided, the Maquiladora did not 
develop a network of domestic suppliers in Mexico. As a result, implementation of Article 303 in 2001 has 
adversely affected the competitiveness of the Maquiladora industry that relies upon non-NAFTA suppliers for inputs 
and has resulted in closure of some Maquiladora firms. 
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THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY AND GLOBAL COMPETITION 
 
 China has competitive advantages over Mexico in terms of labor costs, electricity costs, the diversity of 
component suppliers, the cost of water for industrial uses (important in the textiles industry), and corporate income 
tax rates. These resources are significant components of Maquiladora production. While Mexico faces increased 
competition from China in the U.S. market, some sectors are more threatened than others.  For example, as a 
growing share of some textiles and apparel products sold in the U.S. are being produced in China rather than Mexico 
as shown in Exhibit 6, there has been no shift in competitiveness away from Mexico towards China in the machinery 
sector. Mexico also has comparative advantages over China which include lower transportation costs, shorter transit 
time, and lower international communication costs. Mexico also provides greater protection for intellectual property, 
more transparency in regulation and administration, and a network of free-trade agreements with third-party 
countries. 
 
 
Exhibit 6 
U.S. Imports of Textiles and Apparel from Mexico and China in Billions of U.S. Dollars 
2005 -2007 
Year 2005   2006 2007 
Mexico 7.63 6.85  6.10  
China 26.02 30.12 34.93 
U.S. Total Imports 99.20 101.96 100.40 
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division  
 
 
Watkins (2002), a program manager for the U.S. International Trade Commission, has addressed factors 
affecting export and investment competition between Mexico and China. Watkins emphasized production sharing as 
an important aspect of globalization. Production sharing, also known as cross-border manufacturing networks, 
occurs when the processes used to manufacture a good are conducted in more than one country. Such production 
sharing allows companies to reduce costs or improve response time, thereby becoming more competitive and 
increasing profits. According to Watkins, Mexico can compete more effectively with China in the U.S. market in 
high to medium value-added sectors where there is a high ratio of weight to value (major appliances), where 
competition is based more on quality than price (medical goods), where there are frequent design changes, and 
where it is vital to protect intellectual rights. China has gained in low-value-added, commoditized sectors, such as 
apparel, luggage, and footwear. 
 
 Berges (2003), in a separate study, expressed that Mexico‘s proximity to the United States gives it an edge, 
allowing it to remain competitive as an outsourcing destination in industries characterized by constant changes in 
design specifications, short inventory cycles, and bulky items. The automotive industry is the perfect example. 
According to Berges, this industry should be safe from the ―China threat‖ because original equipment manufacturers 
maintain low inventories and high-value, just-in-time delivery. Further, autos are heavy and bulky, making shipping 
an issue. Finally, auto parts need frequent retooling, making them impractical to produce in China for the U.S. 
market. Mexico can dominate production of products that have similar characteristics. 
 
 Avecedo (2003) additionally conducted a Granger causality analysis to explore the relationship between 
Mexican and Chinese exports. This analysis sought to determine whether Chinese exports to the U.S. displace 
Mexican exports or whether Chinese and Mexican components are complements, with both needed to produce the 
finished product. Acevedo found that only five of the top 15 Mexican exports compete head-to-head with China. In 
10 industries, growing Chinese exports actually represent growth opportunities for Mexico. 
 
 Mexico also faces increased competition from countries in Central America or the Caribbean. The U.S. 
decision in May 2000 to grant NAFTA-parity access to Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries has eroded 
Mexico‘s ability to compete in the U.S. apparel market, particularly because a number of Central American and 
Caribbean countries have lower labor costs than Mexico. The manufacturing wages in Mexico have almost been 67 
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percent higher than in the Dominican Republic and approximately 92 percent higher than in Honduras in recent 
years. 
 
 The heightened global competition from China and CBI countries is part of a larger phenomenon in which 
the benefits enjoyed by the Maquiladora industry and other Mexican producers have eroded as U.S. trade 
preferences or liberalization accorded to other countries have expanded. In addition, under the WTO Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing, all quotas on textile and apparel products had been phased out in 2005 and therefore the U.S. 
imports of textiles and apparel from China rose significantly to make China the largest foreign supplier of these 
goods to the U.S. market.  
 
CURRENT CHALLENGES TO THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY 
 
 Significant challenges continue to confront the Maquiladora industry. The downturn during 2000-2002 has 
accelerated ongoing industry evolution and has been a catalyst for several industry and government changes to 
improve the competitiveness of the Maquiladora. Some of fundamental challenges are as follows: 
 
 Movement beyond the current ―Maquiladora model‖ to attract a new generation of more technologically 
advanced operations that would allow Mexico to remain competitive   including involvement in more 
sophisticated, capital-intensive operations that are less likely to close and move their plants because of 
cyclical downturns.  
 Recognition by the Maquiladora that having sophisticated production and management methods would 
better position it to weather Maquiladora downturn and deal with the continuing challenges. The transition 
to more advanced production, however, requires skilled labor and the majority of Maquiladora workers do 
not have higher education experience. 
 Development of energy reform and modernization of infrastructures.  
 Development of labor reform and improvement of labor skills 
 Pursue of free trade agreements by Mexico with other nations so that Mexico does not rely solely on the 
U.S. market for Maquiladora exports. 
 
FUTURE OF THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY 
 
 The future success of the Maquiladora industry will require fundamental Mexican reforms in the 
development of affordable energy, the enhancement of labor regulations, the improvement of labor skills, the 
modernization of the infrastructure, as well as the ability to deal with the U.S. approaches to trade liberalization and 
homeland security. However, pursuing in some of these areas may be difficult. 
 
Development Of Affordable Energy 
 
 Energy sector reform is important to the Maquiladora industries because they require reliable and 
competitive energy prices to compete with suppliers in other nations. Electricity and industrial water costs are two 
areas in which Mexico is less competitive than China. Without energy reform, Mexico may experience a power 
crisis in the Maquiladora.  
 
Enhancement Of Labor Regulations 
 
 The Maquiladora benefits from labor productivity depend upon reform of labor regulations to provide 
increased flexibility to employers. The key elements of this reform include the use of secret ballots in union 
elections, the allowance of more than one union to represent worker interests, expanded employer flexibility to hire 
workers on a trial basis, and a strengthened binding arbitration process. This reform, however, lacks consensus 
support within the Mexican labor movement. 
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Improvement Of Labor Skills 
 
 The success of Maquiladora to develop more technology-intensive operations requires a large number of 
highly educated workers. However, there is a low level of educational attainment in the economically active 
population along the border, with over one-third of adults having completed only primary education or less. The 
search for better educated workers has led a number of companies to establish assembly plants in cities further from 
the border, with better reputations for good public secondary education and trade schools. 
 
Modernization Of Infrastructure 
 
 The improvement of Mexico‘s infrastructure is critical to advancing Mexico‘s competitiveness. Although 
the six Mexican states that border the U.S. share the advantage of an adequate basic infrastructure, with a road 
network variously described as good, fluid, or satisfactory, about 32 percent of the Mexican federal highways are in 
poor condition. These infrastructure shortcomings are considered a disincentive for potential investors in 
Maquiladora. 
 
Impact Of Recent U.S. Policies  
 
 Action by Mexico is the key to the Maquiladora‘s future viability, particularly since U.S. approaches to 
trade liberalization and homeland security may put additional pressure on Maquiladora operations.  
 
 The future development of the Maquiladora industry in Mexico may be affected by further changes in 
competitors‘ access to the U.S. market. The U.S. is engaged in trade negotiations in several venues, including the 
Doha Round among the 146 members of the WTO, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) involving 34 
nations of the Western Hemisphere, and the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement. These negotiations may 
reduce barriers to non-NAFTA countries‘ products to levels similar to those enjoyed by NAFTA participants, 
Mexico, and Canada. For example, in the WTO, the United States has proposed to eliminate all industrial tariffs by 
2015. Therefore, the expansion of trade benefits to wider numbers of competitors, while benefiting U.S. consumers 
and other trade partners, dilutes the benefits provided to Mexican suppliers in the U.S. market under NAFTA.  
 
 The U.S. security measures instituted at ports of entry after September 11, 2001, could also erode the 
Mexican Maquiladora industry‘s advantage of proximity to U.S. markets. In particular, U.S. government measures 
that require advance notice for transborder shipments of goods and additional information on the entry into and 
departure from the United States of every foreign citizen. Firms that use just-in-time operations, an important 
element in some Maquiladora operations, could be especially hurt by requirements related to advance notice for 
shipments because they could not ship goods immediately upon receipt of  an order. Firms that rely on regular and 
efficient movement of workers and service operations across the border could be especially affected by the 
information requirements for Mexican workers who cross the border frequently.  
 
 Dieck (2003), Chief of Staff of Mexico‘s Ministry of the Economy, offered a realistic perspective of the 
future backdrop against which the industry will operate. He stated that Mexico can no longer offer the lowest wages, 
and it is unwilling to offer the kind of tax incentives some competitors have given. Such incentives are fiscally 
imprudent and a violation of World Trade Organization and Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development rules. Mexico can, however, offer an open economy with free trade agreements with 32 nations, low 
country risk, macroeconomic stability, rule of law, proximity to the United States, and the world‘s largest market. 
Mexico is moving toward a further opening of trade, reform of energy, labor, tax, and telecommunications, and 
some targeted incentives for research and development. With these advances, Mexico offers an attractive setting for 
future foreign investment. 
 
The New IMMEX Program 
 
The Mexican Secretariat of Economy launched the new IMMEX Program in November 2006 to expand the 
Maquiladora program with a broader scope. IMMEX is the Spanish acronym for the Program of ‗Manufacturing 
Industry, Maquiladora and Export Services‘ which combined the Maquiladora Program with the PITEX Program. 
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PITEX is the Spanish acronym for the ‗Temporary Imports for Exports‘.  This new IMMEX Program was created to 
promote the export activities of approximately 6,500 enterprises. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Both the U.S. and Mexico have an interest in the future of Maquiladora given their central role in the U.S.-
Mexico trade and the border economy. Partly driven by Maquiladora, Mexico has assumed a more prominent place 
among U.S. trade partners in recent years, becoming the United States‘ third leading trading partner, after China and 
Canada. Moreover, production and employment linkages have developed between Maquiladora and producers 
throughout the U.S. and are based on the high volume of U.S.-generated components used in Maquiladora 
operations. Businesses in communities on the U.S. side of the border provide services to the Maquiladora, such as 
customs brokerage and commercial transportation. Retail sales to Mexican citizens in U.S. border communities 
contribute substantially to U.S. business and tax receipts. The decline in Mexico‘s Maquiladora production and 
employment has taken its toll on cross-border trade and trade-related employment in certain U.S. border 
communities.  
 
Maquiladora have become an even more important element of the Mexican economy, particularly over the 
decade of the 1990‘s, when Maquiladora growth propelled Mexico into the ranks of the world‘s leading exporters 
and generated over a million new jobs. Employment created by Maquiladora on the Mexican side of the border has 
become a foundation of economic activities in that country. The downturn of 2000-2002 has served as a catalyst for 
further transformation of the Maquiladora industry as well as Mexican industry and government efforts to restore 
competitiveness. Although employment and the number of plants have increased since its lowest level in 2002, the 
Maquiladora industry still has a long way to reach the highest level of 2000 numbers. 
 
With the creation of IMMEX program, the Maquiladora industry must reinvent itself to compete in the 
global market. The new model for Maquiladora should include emphasis on attracting and retaining high-tech plants, 
establishing capital-intensive plants with quick and just-in-time response for customers in volatile markets, 
expending full-fledged efforts at vertical integration of the industry, investing in R&D, and improving Mexican 
efforts to create an environment where cross-border links between U.S. and Mexican firms and communities can 
continue to prosper.  
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